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ABSTRACT
Automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems have been widely
deployed in modern smart devices to provide convenient and di-
verse voice-controlled services. Since ASR systems are vulnerable
to audio replay attacks that can spoof and mislead ASR systems, a
number of defense systems have been proposed to identify replayed
audio signals based on the speakers’ unique acoustic features in the
frequency domain. In this paper, we uncover a new type of replay
attack calledmodulated replay attack, which can bypass the existing
frequency domain based defense systems. The basic idea is to com-
pensate for the frequency distortion of a given electronic speaker
using an inverse filter that is customized to the speaker’s transform
characteristics. Our experiments on real smart devices confirm the
modulated replay attacks can successfully escape the existing detec-
tion mechanisms that rely on identifying suspicious features in the
frequency domain. To defeat modulated replay attacks, we design
and implement a countermeasure named DualGuard. We discover
and formally prove that no matter how the replay audio signals
could be modulated, the replay attacks will either leave ringing
artifacts in the time domain or cause spectrum distortion in the fre-
quency domain. Therefore, by jointly checking suspicious features
in both frequency and time domains, DualGuard can successfully
detect various replay attacks including the modulated replay at-
tacks. We implement a prototype of DualGuard on a popular voice
interactive platform, ReSpeaker Core v2. The experimental results
show DualGuard can achieve 98% accuracy on detecting modulated
replay attacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Security in hardware; • Human-
centered computing→ Human computer interaction (HCI).
KEYWORDS
modulated replay attack; automatic speech recognition; ringing
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1 INTRODUCTION
Automatic speech recognition (ASR) has been a ubiquitous tech-
nique widely used in human-computer interaction systems, such
as Google Assistant [5], Amazon Alexa [4], Apple Siri [52], Face-
book Portal [45], and Microsoft Cortana [14]. With advanced ASR
techniques, these systems take voice commands as inputs and act
on them to provide diverse voice-controlled services. People now
can directly use voice to unlock mobile phone [20, 39], send private
messages [2], log in to mobile apps [6], make online payments [48],
activate smart home devices [51], and unlock a car door [36].
Although ASR provides many benefits and conveniences, recent
studies have found a number of attacks that can effectively spoof
and mislead ASR systems [8, 11, 29, 31, 38, 47, 49, 53, 70, 71, 74, 75].
One of themost powerful and practical attacks is the audio replay at-
tack [8, 29, 38], where a pre-recorded voice sample collected from a
genuine victim is played back to spoof ASR systems. Consequently,
it can easily bypass voice authentication and inject voice commands
to conduct malicious activities [25]. For example, a mobile device
can be unlocked by simply replaying a pre-recorded voice com-
mand of its owner [29]. Even worse, the audio replay attack can be
easily launched by anyone without specific knowledge in speech
processing or other computer techniques. Also, the prevalence of
portable recording devices, especially smartphones, makes audio
replay attacks one of the most practical threats to ASR systems.
To defeat audio replay attacks, researchers have proposed a num-
ber of mechanisms to detect abnormal frequency features of audio
signals, such as Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficient (LPCC) [33],
Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) [68], Constant Q Cep-
stral Coefficients (CQCC) [56], and Mel Wavelet Packet Coeffi-
cients (MWPC) [42]. A recent study [65] shows that the amplitude-
frequency characteristics in a high-frequency sub-band will change
significantly under the replay attack, and thus they can be leveraged
to detect the attack. Another study [8] discovers that the signal
energy in the low-frequency sub-bands can also be leveraged to dis-
tinguish if the voice comes from a human or an electronic speaker.
Moreover, due to the degraded amplitude components caused by
the replay noise, the frequency modulation features [21, 28, 55]
can be leveraged into detection. Overall, existing countermeasures
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are effective on detecting all known replay attacks by checking
suspicious features in the frequency domain.
In this paper, we present a new replay attack namedmodulated re-
play attack, which can generate replay audios with almost the same
frequency spectrum as human voices to bypass the existing coun-
termeasures. Inspired by the loudspeaker equalization techniques
in auditory research that targets at improving the sound effect of
an audio system [13], the core idea of modulated replay attack is to
compensate for the differences in the frequency domain between
replay audios and human voices. Through a measurement study on
ASR systems, we find the differences in the frequency domain are
caused by the playback electronic speakers, which typically have
a non-flat frequency response with non-regular oscillations in the
passband. In reality, an speaker can hardly output all frequencies
with equal power due to its mechanical design and the crossover
nature if the speaker possesses more than one driver [10]. Thus,
when the genuine human audio is replayed, electronic speakers ex-
ert different spectral gains on the frequency spectrum of the replay
audio, leading to different distortion degrees. Typically, electronic
speakers suppress the low-frequency components and enhance the
high-frequency components of the genuine human audio.
By evaluating the transfer characteristic of electronic speakers,
we are able to customize a pre-processing inverse filter for any
given speaker. By applying the inverse filter before replaying the
human audio, the spectral effects caused by the speaker devices can
be offset. Consequently, the attacker can produce spoofed audios
that are difficult to be distinguished from real human voices in the
frequency domain. We conduct experiments to demonstrate the
feasibility and effectiveness of the modulated replay attack against
8 existing replay detection mechanisms using 6 real speaker devices.
The experimental results show that the detection accuracy of most
frequency-based countermeasure significantly drops from above
90% to around 10% under our attack, and even the best countermea-
sure using MWPC [42] drops from above 97% to around 50%. One
major reason is that modulated replay attack is a new type of attack
that leverages loudspeaker frequency response compensation.
To defeat the modulated replay attack as well as classical replay
attacks, we propose a new dual-domain defense method named Du-
alGuard that cross-checks suspicious features in both time domain
and frequency domain, which is another major contribution in this
paper. The key insight of our defense is that it is inevitable for
any replay attacks to either leave ringing artifacts [63] in the time
domain or cause spectrum distortion in the frequency domain, even
if the replay audio signals have been modulated. We formally prove
the correctness and universality of our key insight. In the time
domain, ringing artifacts will cause spurious oscillations, which
generate a large number of local extreme points in replay audio
waveforms. DualGuard extracts and leverages those local extrema
patterns to train a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier that
distinguishes modulated replay attacks from human voices. In the
frequency domain, spectrum distortion will generate dramatically
different power spectrum distributions compared to human voices.
Also, DualGuard applies the area under the CDF curve (AUC) of
power spectrum distributions to filter out classical replay attacks.
Therefore, DualGuard can effectively identify replay audio by per-
forming the checks in two domains.
We implement a prototype of DualGuard on a voice interactive
platform, ReSpeaker Core v2 [57]. We conduct extensive experi-
ments to evaluate its effectiveness and performance on detecting
replay attacks. The experimental results show that DualGuard can
achieve about 98% detection accuracy against the modulated replay
attack and over 90% detection accuracy against classical replay
attacks. Moreover, we show that DualGuard works well under dif-
ferent noisy environments. Particularly, the detection accuracy only
decreases by 3.2% on average even with a bad signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) of 40 dB. DualGuard is lightweight and can be deployed to
work online in real ASR systems. For example, our testbed platform
takes 5.5ms on average to process a signal segment of 32ms length
using 24.2% CPU and 12.05 MB memory.
In summary, our paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose a new modulated replay attack against ASR systems,
utilizing a specific software-based inverse filter to offset suspi-
cious features in the frequency domain. By compensating the
electronic speaker’s non-flat frequency response in the passband,
modulated replay attacks can bypass existing replay detection
mechanisms.
• We design a novel defense system named DualGuard to detect all
replay attacks including the modulated replay attacks by check-
ing suspicious features in both frequency domain and time do-
main. We formally prove that replay attacks cannot escape from
being detected in both time and frequency domains.
• We verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the modulated re-
play attack through real experiments using multiple speaker
devices over existing replay detection mechanisms. We also im-
plement a prototype of DualGuard on a popular voice platform
and demonstrate its effectiveness and efficiency in detecting all
replay attacks.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce necessary background information on
audio signal processing, ASR systems, and replay attacks.
2.1 Audio Signal Processing
As there are so many technical terms on voice signal processing, we
only briefly introduce two necessary terms that are tightly related
to our work.
Signal Frequency Spectrum. Generally, a signal is represented
as a time-domain form x(t), recording the signal amplitude at each
time point. Frequency spectrum is another signal representation,
providing a way to analyze the signal in the frequency domain.
Fourier analysis [50] can decompose a time-domain signal as the
sum of multiple sinusoidal signals of different frequencies, i.e.,
x(t) = ∑n An · sin (2π fnt + ϕn ). The n-th sinusoidal signal is called
the frequency component with a frequency value of fn . The set
of {An } is called the amplitude spectrum that represents the am-
plitude of each frequency component. {ϕn } is the phase spectrum
recording the phase of each component. The frequency spectrum
of a signal is the combination of amplitude and phase spectrum.
Frequency Response. Frequency response represents the output
frequency and phase spectrum of a system or a device in response
to a stimulus signal [46]. When a stimulus signal that is typically
a single-frequency sine wave passes through a system, the ratio
of the output to input amplitude (i.e., signal gain) varies with the
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Figure 1: ASR Systems.
input frequency of the stimulus signal. The amplitude response of
the system represents the signal gains at all frequencies. Hence, the
output amplitude spectrum of a signal is the product of the input
amplitude spectrum and the amplitude response of the system. A
system is a high-pass (low-pass) filter if the system has a higher am-
plitude response in the high-frequency (low-frequency) range. The
phase response of a system represents the phase shifts of different
frequency signals passing through the system.
2.2 ASR Systems and Replay Attacks
Figure 1 shows an automatic speech recognition (ASR) system. A
recording device such as a microphone captures the audio signals
from the air and converts the acoustic vibrations into electrical
signals. Then, the analog electrical signals are converted to digital
signals for signal processing. The processed digital signals are used
for speech recognition or speaker identification in the subsequent
processing of the ASR systems. These digital signals are commonly
referred to as the genuine audio if the signals are directly collected
from the live human speakers.
ASR systems are vulnerable to replay attacks. The classical replay
attack model contains four basic components, i.e., a recording de-
vice, an analog-to-digital (A/D) converter, a digital-to-analog (D/A)
converter, and a playback device such as a loudspeaker. Compared
with the normal speech recognition steps in the ASR systems, the
replay attack contains a replay process as shown in Figure 2(a). The
attacker firstly collects the genuine human voice using a recording
device and converts the voice to a digital signal by an A/D con-
verter. The digital signal can be stored in a disk device as a lossless
compression format or be spread through the Internet. After that,
the attacker playbacks the digital signal near the targeted ASR sys-
tem, which spoofs the system to provide expected services. In the
playback process, the stored digital signal is converted to an analog
electric signal by a D/A converter. Then, the electric signal will be
played as an acoustic wave by a playback device.
3 MODULATED REPLAY ATTACKS
In this section, we propose a new attack called modulated replay
attack. By analyzing the replay model and replay detection meth-
ods, we find the existing defenses rely on the features of amplitude
spectrum. Based on these observations, we propose a method to esti-
mate the speaker response and build an inverse filter to compensate
the amplitude spectrum of the replay signals. The reconstructed
replay signals can bypass the existing defenses.
3.1 Impacts of Replay Components
Although classical replay attacks can achieve a high success rate in
spoofing ASR systems, some acoustic features can still be utilized
to distinguish the replay audio from the genuine audio. As shown
in Figure 2(a), the main difference between these two types of audio
is the additional replay process that the replay audio goes through.
We study the impacts from four components involved in the
replay process, namely, the recording device, A/D converter, D/A
converter, and the playback device. We observe that the impacts
from the first three components are negligible, and the most sig-
nificant impacts on replay signals come from the playback device.
First, an attacker needs to use a recording device to collect the voice
command. The main factors that influence the recording process
include the non-linearity of modern microphones and the ambient
noise. However, the nonlinear frequency range of a microphone is
much higher than the human speech frequency. When it comes to
the ambient noise, it is hard to tell if the noise is introduced during
the attacker’s recording process or the ASR recording phase.
Second, when the A/D converter transforms the signal into a
digital form, it may cause the information loss of the analog signal
due to the sampling and quantization operations. However, this
effect is limited since the modern recording devices have a higher
sampling rate (not less than 44.1 kHz) and a higher bit depth (usually
higher than 16-bit resolution) than the old-fashioned recorders.
Third, the signal can be transformed back into the analog form by
the D/A converter, where a low-pass filter is used to eliminate the
high-frequency components caused by sampling. As the sampling
frequency is at least 10 times larger than the speech frequency, the
filter in the D/A converter has little effect on the audio signals.
Finally, we find the most significant effects on the replay signal
are caused by the playback device. Because of the shape and volume,
the acoustic characteristics of loudspeakers are greatly different
from those of human vocal organs. Due to the resonance of the
speaker enclosure, the voice from loudspeakers contains low-power
"additive" noise. These resonant frequency components are typ-
ically within 20-60 Hz that human cannot produce [8]. Another
important feature of loudspeakers is the low-frequency response
distortion due to the limited size of loudspeakers. Within the speech
frequency range, the amplitude response of a loudspeaker is a high-
pass filter with a cut-off frequency typically near 500 Hz [59]. As a
result, the power of low-frequency components will be attenuated
rapidly when a voice signal passes through a loudspeaker, which is
the "multiplicative" characteristic of speakers in human speech fre-
quency range [46]. Even though the genuine audio and the replay
audio have the same fundamental frequency and harmonic fre-
quencies, the power distributions of frequency components remain
different. The low-frequency components of replay audio have a
smaller power proportion compared with those of genuine audio.
Because the different power distributions lead to different timbre,
the voice signals sound different even with the same loudness and
fundamental frequency.
3.2 Attack Overview
Based on our observation that existing defenses utilize the ampli-
tude spectrum to detect replay attacks, the key idea of our proposed
attack is to modulate the voice signal so that the replay audio has
the same amplitude spectrum as the genuine audio. As shown in
Figure 2(b), the most critical component is the modulation processor
between the A/D and D/A conversion. The modulation processor
can compensate for the amplitude spectrum distortion caused by
the replay process. By adding the modulation processor, we can
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Figure 2: Classical Replay Attacks vs. Modulated Replay Attacks.
deal with the modulated replay process as an all-pass filter, so that
the modulated replay audio will have an equivalent processing flow
as the genuine audio.
In the classical replay process, the recording device and the
A/D and D/A conversion have limited effects on the replay audio.
Thus, our modulation processor mainly targets the playback device,
specifically, the amplitude response of it. There are many types of
playback devices, such as mobile phones, MP3 players, and remote
IoT devices in the victim’s home.We acquire the amplitude response
of a playback device by measuring the output spectrum in response
to different frequency inputs. If the playback device is under remote
control that the amplitude response cannot be measured directly,
we can estimate an approximate response from the same or similar
devices. After acquiring the amplitude response of the playback
device, we design an inverse filter that is a key component in the
modulation processor to compensate for the distortion of the signal
spectrum. After the spectrum modulation, the modulated replay
audio can bypass existing frequency-based defense.
In our modulated replay attack, the modulation processor only
deals with the voice signals in digital form. Therefore, the inverse
filter is designed by digital signal processing (DSP) techniques. The
modulated signals can be stored or spread through the Internet to
launch a remote replay attack.
3.3 Modulation Processor
The structure of the modulation processor is shown in Figure 3. The
recorded audio is a digital signal collected from the genuine human
voice. The audio is then transformed from the time domain to the
frequency domain by fast Fourier transform algorithm. The FFT
output is a complex frequency spectrum that can be divided into
two parts: (1) the amplitude spectrum that records the amplitude
for each frequency component, and (2) the phase spectrum that
records the phase angle for each frequency component. We only
process the amplitude spectrum in the modulation processor for
two reasons. One reason is that both the ASR systems and the
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Figure 3: The modulation processor.
replay detection systems extract signal features from the amplitude
spectrum. Another reason is that the human ear is less sensitive to
the sound phase compared to the sound amplitude. Therefore, the
phase spectrum will remain the same in the modulation processor.
The inverse filter, estimated based on the speaker properties, is
the key component in the modulation processor. Specifically, the
inverse filter is an engine in the spectrum filtering unit, transform-
ing the amplitude spectrum to a compensated spectrum. By the
spectrum filtering, the inverse filter can offset the distortion effect
caused by the playback device. Therefore, the amplitude responses
of the inverse filter and the loudspeaker are complementary, be-
cause the combination of these two transfer functions is a constant
function that represents an all-pass filter.
After processing the amplitude spectrum with the inverse filter,
we can obtain a compensated spectrum that has a better frequency
characteristic in the low-frequency range. With both the compen-
sated spectrum and the phase spectrum, the inverse fast Fourier
transform (iFFT) is utilized to convert the reconstructed signal from
frequency domain to time domain. Finally, we can get a modulated
audio in the time domain. Moreover, the modulated audio will be
stored as a digital format, which is ready to be used to launch the
modulated replay attack.
Test Signal Speaker Recorder
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Figure 4: The method to estimate the speaker response.
3.4 Inverse Filter Estimation
The inverse filter is estimated through the speaker properties. There-
fore, it is necessary to measure the amplitude response of the loud-
speaker directly. If it is not possible for direct measurement, the
amplitude response can be estimated by measuring the speakers in
the same or similar model.
Whenmeasuring the speaker properties, we set a single-frequency
test signal as the speaker input and record the output audio, as
shown in Figure 4(a). Through checking the output amplitude spec-
trum, we can get the output amplitude of the corresponding fre-
quency. The amplitude response of the single frequency is the out-
put amplitude divided by the input amplitude. Through changing
the input frequency of the test signal, we can obtain the amplitude
response over the entire speech frequency range.
Because the test frequencies of the input signals are discrete, the
amplitude response is a series of discrete data points, as shown in
Figure 4(b). To obtain a continuous response function over the en-
tire frequency range, we fill in the missing data by the curve fitting.
Cubic spline interpolation [24] will be used to construct a continu-
ous and smooth response curve H (f ) with multiple polynomials of
degree 3.
As the inverse filter is implemented on the digital signals, we
need to convert the continuous response function into a digital
form. After the Fourier transform, the signal spectrum has a fixed
frequency interval ∆f denoting the frequency resolution. Hence,
we sample the continuous response function at the same frequency
interval and get a finer-grained amplitude response. The digital
amplitude response of the electronic speaker is denoted as H (k).
After obtaining the speaker amplitude response, we can design
the inverse filter by the complementary principle. The amplitude
responses of the inverse filter and the speaker can cancel each other,
minimizing the impact of the replay process. Hence, the inverse
filter H−1(k) should satisfy the all-pass condition that H−1(k) ·
H (k) = C whenH (k) , 0.C is a positive constant which is typically
1. In addition, if H (k) = 0 for any k , H−1(k) should also be 0.
Another speaker property is the sub-bass (0-60 Hz) energy, which
can be generated by loudspeakers, not humans. The sub-bass fea-
tures are dependent on the speaker models and enclosure struc-
ture [8]. Although attackers may pick the speakers to minimize
the sub-bass energy, we still need to minimize the possibility of
detected by the sub-bass features. Hence, we optimize the inverse
filter in two ways. We set H−1(k) = 0 when the frequency is within
0-60 Hz, because we do not want to amplify the existing noise in
the sub-bass range. Another way is to enhance the inverse filter re-
sponse in the speech frequency range so as to decrease the relative
proportion of the additive sub-bass energy. By these optimizations,
we can decrease the metric of sub-bass energy balance under the
detection threshold.
By applying the inverse filter before the playback device, we
can compensate the unwanted replay effects that are caused by the
electronic speakers.
3.5 Spectrum Processing
The spectrumprocessingwill involve three phases: the time-frequency
domain conversion, the amplitude spectrum filtering, and the mod-
ulated signal reconstruction.
3.5.1 Time-Frequency Domain Conversion. First, we need to con-
vert the recorded audio from the time domain into the frequency
domain, because it is easier to filter the signals in the frequency
domain. For a L-length signal segment, we pad the signal with zeros
so that the total signal length would be N , where N is the smallest
power of 2 greater than or equal to L. The extended signal is de-
noted as x(n),n = 0, 1, ...,N − 1. Then we convert the time-domain
signal x(n) into the frequency-domain representation X (k) through
the fast Fourier transform algorithm.
X (k) =
N−1∑
n=0
x(n) · e−i2πkn/N ,k = 0, 1, ...,N − 1 (1)
X (k) is the frequency spectrum of the original signal in the form
of complex numbers. The frequency resolution is defined as the
frequency interval ∆f = fs/N , where fs is the sampling rate of the
recording audio.
Then we split the complex frequency spectrum into two parts.
The magnitude spectrum Xm (k) = |X (k)|, represents the signal am-
plitude of different frequency components k ·∆f ,k = 0, 1, ...,N − 1.
The phase spectrum Xp (k) = ∠X (k) in radians, which is indepen-
dent with the amplitude information, represents where the fre-
quency components lie in time.
3.5.2 Spectrum Filtering. The inverse filter will only be imple-
mented in the amplitude spectrum. The phase spectrum will remain
unchanged. The effect of applying a filter is to change the shape
of the original amplitude spectrum. According to the system re-
sponse theory, the compensated amplitude spectrum is the product
of the input amplitude spectrum and the amplitude response of
the inverse filter. Hence, after modulating the signal with the in-
verse filter H−1(k), the compensated spectrum Ym (k) satisfies that
Ym (k) = Xm (k) · H−1(k).
Note that the amplitude spectrum of the speaker output is also
the product of the input amplitude spectrum and the speaker am-
plitude response. Therefore, the amplitude spectrum of the modu-
lated replay audio will be Sm (k) = Ym (k) · H (k). We can find that
Sm (k) = Xm (k) ·H−1(k) ·H (k) = C ·Xm (k). BecauseC is a constant,
the power distribution of frequency components in the modulated
replay audio will be the same as that in the genuine audio, making
it harder for ASR systems to detect the replay attack.
3.5.3 Modulated Signal Reconstruction. After modifying the ampli-
tude spectrum to compensate for the energy loss in the following
playback phase, we need to reconstruct the signal in the frequency
domain. The modulated signal will have the compensated ampli-
tude spectrum and remain the original phase spectrum. Therefore,
the complex frequency spectrum will be reconstructed by the am-
plitudeYm (k) and the phase angleXp (k). That means the frequency
spectrum of the modulated signal should be Y (k) = Ym (k) · eiXp (k )
according to the exponential form of complex numbers. After re-
constructing the modulated signal in the frequency domain, the
complex frequency spectrum Y (k) will be converted back into the
time domain by the inverse fast Fourier transform algorithm.
y(n) = 1
N
N−1∑
k=0
Y (k) · ei2πkn/N ,n = 0, 1, ...,N − 1 (2)
To ensure that the length of the modulated audio is the same
as that of the original audio, the last (N − L) data points in y(n)
will be discarded. Hence, the total signal length of the modulated
audio would be L. Then, the final modulated audio will be saved as
a digital format to complete the replay attack.
4 COUNTERMEASURE: DUAL-DOMAIN
DETECTION
In this section, we propose a countermeasure calledDualGuard against
the modulated replay attack. Due to the similarity of the amplitude
spectrum between the modulated replay signals and the genuine
signals, the defense will be conducted not only in the frequency
domain, but also in the time domain.
4.1 Defense Overview
In our scheme, our countermeasure contains two inseparable parts:
frequency-domain defense and time-domain defense. A voice com-
mand must pass both defenses in time and frequency domains
before it can be accepted by ASR systems.
The frequency-domain defense is proved to be effective against
classical replay attacks. Because of the frequency spectrum dis-
tortion caused by the replay process, we use the power spectrum
distribution (timbre) to distinguish the classical replay audio. The
area under the CDF curve (AUC) of the power spectrum distribution
is extracted as the key frequency-domain feature. We find that the
AUC value of the genuine audio is statistically larger than that of
the replay audio. By utilizing the frequency-domain defense, we
filter out the threat from the classical replay attacks.
The modulated replay audio has the same amplitude spectrum as
the genuine audio. Hence, we need to detect the modulated replay
audio in other domains. In the phase domain, there is no useful
information in the phase spectrum, which records the starting
points of each frequency component in the time axis. But in the time
domain, we discover and formally prove the following theorem.
Theorem. There are inevitably spurious oscillations (ringing arti-
facts) in the modulated replay audio. The amplitude of the ringing
artifacts is restricted by the signal amplitude spectrum and absolute
phase shifts.
The mathematical proof of the theorem is demonstrated in Ap-
pendix A. In the time domain, based on this theorem, there are
small ringing artifacts in the modulated replay signals. However,
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Figure 5: The local extrema under different granularity.
in the genuine audio and the classical replay audio, the waveform
is statistically smooth.
We define a new metric called local extrema ratio to quantita-
tively describe the strengths of the ringing artifacts. We utilize local
extrema ratios at different granularity as the key time-domain fea-
ture and filter out modulated replay attacks using an SVM classifier.
4.2 Time-domain Defense
Because of the difficulty in detecting the modulated replay audio
via frequency and phase features, we seek the defenses in the time
domain. By our observations and mathematical proof (see Appen-
dix A), we find there are small ringing artifacts in the time-domain
signals when performing the modulated replay attack. Although
these time-domain artifacts correspond to the high-frequency com-
ponents, the power of the artifact is too small to be detected in the
frequency domain because the maximum amplitude is constraint
by the Equation (11). In the frequency domain, the ringing artifacts
can be easily mistaken for the ambient noise. Hence, we propose
a time-domain defense method that utilizes the pattern of small
ringing artifacts in the modulated replay audio.
The ringing artifacts pattern is a robust feature that cannot be
further compensated by a higher-order filter. The ringing artifacts
are caused by the physical property, but not the modulated process
itself. When we modulate the recorded audio, there are no ringing
artifacts in the processed audio. The ringing artifacts only occur
after replaying the processed audio, thus becoming an inevitable
feature in the modulated replay audio. In order to describe the
ringing artifacts in the time-domain signals, we take local extreme
ratio as the metric. We firstly give a definition of local extrema.
Definition: In a signal segment y, if a sampling point yi is the
maximum value or theminimum value in the (2r+1)-lengthwindow
[yi−r ,yi+r ], yi is a local extrema in the time-domain signal. Note
that if the index of the window element is out of bounds, we will
pad the window with the nearest effective element.
Local extrema ratio (LER) is defined as the ratio of the local
extrema amount to the total signal length. Given an input signal
segment, the local extrema ratio correlates with the window pa-
rameter r . When the window size is small, the LER calculation is
in fine granularity that reflects the small ringing artifacts in the
time-domain signals. When the window size is large, LER shows the
overall change trend of the signals. The modulated replay signals
and the genuine signals have different patterns in local extrema
ratio with different granularity. We can detect the modulated replay
attack via identifying the LER patterns with different parameter
r ∈ [1, rmax ]. Algorithm 1 shows the function of obtaining the local
extrema patterns and detecting the modulated replay audio.
In Figure 5(a), under the coarse granularity (larger window size),
the number of local extrema does not differ much between modu-
lated replay audio and genuine audio. However, in Figure 5(b), the
situation would be different under the fine granularity (smaller win-
dow size). Due to the ringing artifacts, small spurious oscillations
occur in modulated replay audio. The number of local extrema in
modulated replay audio will be significantly larger than that in
genuine audio, which becomes a critical feature that helps us de-
tect the modulated replay attack. A Support Vector Machine (SVM)
classifier is trained to distinguish modulated replay audio by deter-
mining the local extrema pattern (LEP) with different granularity.
The time-domain attack detection is shown in Algorithm 1. The
audio will become the candidate audio for the frequency-domain
checking if it does not come from the modulated replay attack.
Algorithm 1 Time-Domain Modulated Replay Detection
Input: an audio signal y, the largest wnd parameter rmax
Output: whether there is a modulated replay attack
1: l ← lenдth(y)
2: cnt ← 0
3: LEP ← [ ]
4: for r ← 1 to rmax do
5: /∗ Calculate Local Extrema Ratio ∗ /
6: for i ← 1 to (l − 2) do
7: low ←max(i − r , 0)
8: hiдh ←min(i + r , l − 1)
9: w ← [ylow , ...,yhiдh ]
10: if wr = Min(w) orwr = Max(w) then
11: /∗ Get a Local Extreme Point ∗ /
12: cnt ← cnt + 1
13: LEPi = cnt/(l − 2)
14: /∗ Identi f y Modulated Replay Attacks with LEP ∗ /
15: if SVM_Classi f ier (LEP) = 1 then
16: outputmodulated replay attacks
17: else
18: output candidate audio
4.3 Frequency-domain Defense
The frequency-domain defense is used to counter the classic replay
attack. It is based on the noticeable different timbre of the voice
sounded from human and electronic speakers.
In the replay model, each component frequency in the genuine
audio is exactly the same as that in the replay audio, no matter
the fundamental frequency or the harmonics. For example, if the
fundamental frequency of the genuine audio is 500 Hz, the replay
audio will also have a fundamental frequency of 500 Hz. However,
even with the same component frequencies, the genuine human
voice and the replay voice sound different in our perception. The
main reason is the power distributions of the frequency components,
namely the timbre, are different.
For human, our voice is sounded from the phonatory organ. The
typical sound frequency for human is within the range from 85 Hz
to 4 kHz, where the low-frequency components are dominant. For
electronic speakers, there is an acoustic defect on the low-frequency
components due to the speaker structure, materials, and the limited
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Figure 6: Cumulative density function of spectral power dis-
tribution for genuine and direct replay audios.
size. The power of the replay signals decays dramatically in the low-
frequency range, especially under 500 Hz. Meanwhile, the human
fundamental frequency range is 64-523 Hz for men, and 160-1200
Hz for women. Hence, the electronic speakers will attenuate the
power in the human fundamental frequency because of the speaker
properties. With respect to the power distribution, the power of
the genuine audio is mainly concentrated in the low-frequency
range, while the power of the replay audio is more distributed in
the speech frequency range. Our frequency-domain defense utilizes
these timbre features to defeat the classic replay attack.
Algorithm 2 Frequency-Domain Replay Detection
Input: an audio signal y, FFT point numbers N ,
decision threshold Ath
Output: whether there is a classical replay attack
1: /∗ Calculate Normalized Siдnal Power Spectrum ∗ /
2: K ← FFT (y,N )
3: p ← ∑N−1i=0 K2i
4: for i ← 0 to N − 1 do
5: Di = K2i /p
6: /∗ Calculate the CDF and its AUC ∗ /
7: A0 = D0
8: for i ← 1 to N − 1 do
9: Ai = Ai−1 + Di
10: AUC =
∑N−1
i=0 Ai/N
11: /∗ Identi f y Classical Replay Attacks with AUC ∗ /
12: if AUC < Ath then
13: output replay attacks
14: else
15: output дenuine audio
Timbre is described by the power distribution of different fre-
quency components. It is necessary to define a mathematical de-
scription for the timbre. When an ASR system captures a voice
signal from the air with a sampling rate of fs , we firstly obtain
the amplitude spectrum of the signal through N -point fast Fourier
transform. The signal amplitude spectrum is denoted as K(n), n =
0, ...,N − 1, with the frequency resolution ∆f = fs/N . The fre-
quency value of the i-th component is i · ∆f , while the ampli-
tude is K(i). Hence, the signal power spectrum is K2(n), and the
power spectral density (PSD) of frequency components is defined
as D(n) = K2(n)/∑N−1i=0 K2(i). To distinguish the different power
distributions, we measure the cumulative density function (CDF)
A(n) for the power spectral density,
A(n) =
n∑
i=0
D(i) =
n∑
i=0
K2(i)/
N−1∑
i=0
K2(i). (3)
A(n) is a monotonically increasing function, with a range of
[0, 1]. As shown in Figure 6, the power spectrum CDF of genuine
audios and replay audios are quite different. For genuine audios, the
power is concentrated in the low-frequency range, so the CDF rises
more quickly. For replay audios, the CDF function grows slower
due to the more distributed power spectrum. We utilize the CDF
characteristic to distinguish replay audios from genuine audios.
We utilize the area under the CDF curve (AUC) to verify and
filter out the classic replay audio. AUC is calculated as
∑
n A(n)/N .
If the AUC value is less than a specific thresholdATH ∈ (0, 1), there
is a classic replay attack. We show the frequency-domain attack
detection in Algorithm 2.
4.4 Security Analysis
We discover and prove that there are inevitably either ringing arti-
facts in the time domain or spectrum distortion in the frequency
domain, no matter if replay signals are modulated.
For the frequency-domain defense, the principle comes from the
signal difference of the power spectrum distributions. It is known
that human speech is not a single-frequency signal, but a signal with
fundamental frequency f and several harmonics nf ,n ≥ 2. Within
the human voice frequency range, the speaker response has a great
difference in the low-frequency band and the high-frequency band,
which meansH (f ) , H (nf ). As a result, the power ratio of genuine
audioA(f )/A(nf ) is different from that of the corresponding replay
audio (H (f )·A(f ))/(H (nf )·A(nf )). The different power ratios cause
the difference in the power spectrum distributions.
For the time-domain defense, we can prove that there are in-
evitably spurious oscillations (ringing artifacts) in the modulated
replay audio. The critical factor is the inevitable phase shifts that
cannot be accurately measured (see details in Appendix A). Al-
though the amplitude spectrums are the same, the signal phase
spectrums can be different. The relationship between the amplitude
spectrum to the time-domain signals is a one-to-many relationship.
Moreover, we cannot compensate for the phase shifts due to the
limits of the accuracy in measurements. Even a small phase error
can cause ringing artifacts in the time-domain. That is why we need
to check the signals in both frequency domain and time domain.
Besides, the high local extrema ratio in the modulated replay
audio can result from other aspects, i.e. the measurement error, the
FFT truncation effect, and the time-domain joint. First, the mea-
surement involves exponential computation, where the round-off
errors can be accumulated so that the amplitude estimation is not
accurate, finally bringing about parasitic vibration in the modulated
replay signals. Second, the real FFT operation works on a finite-
length signal, which is equivalent to adding a window function to
an infinite-length signal. The window function in the time domain
corresponds to a sinc(x) function convolved in the frequency do-
main, causing the frequency spectrum to expand and overlap. Third,
when splicing the reconstructed signals into new audio, there is no
guarantee of the continuity at the starting and ending splice points.
A discontinuous splice point can lead to ringing artifacts due to the
Gibbs phenomenon [77].
Moreover, ringing artifacts cannot be further compensated by
a higher-order filter since ringing artifacts only occur after the
replay process rather than after the modulation process. Moreover,
the iterative filtering scheme can reduce ringing artifacts in image
restoration that are mainly caused by overshoot and oscillations in
the step response of an image filter [63]. However, it is not suitable
for speech signals because the ringing artifacts are introduced by
hardware properties. Even if attackers might reduce ringing arti-
facts to a certain extent, the time-domain defense can still detect
modulated replay audio. This is because our method does not rely
on the amplitude threshold of ringing artifacts. Although the ampli-
tude of ringing artifacts may decrease, the local extrema cannot be
eliminated. The time-domain defense uses local extrema as features
so that even small ringing artifacts can be detected.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct experiments in a real testbed to evaluate
the modulated replay attack and our defense.
Figure 7: The testbed in our experiments.
5.1 Experiment Setup
We use a TASCAM DR-40 digital recorder for collecting the voice
signals. The sampling rate of the digital recorder is set to 96 kHz by
default.We conduct real experiments with a variety of common elec-
tronic devices in our lives, including iPhone X, iPad Pro, Mi Phone 4,
Google Nexus 5, Bose Soundlink Micro, and Samsung UN65H6203
Smart TV. Figure 7 shows the testbed in our experiments. We aim to
demonstrate that both our attack and countermeasure scheme can
be applied to various speaker devices. To generate modulated re-
play audios, we apply MATLAB to estimate the amplitude response
and design the inverse filter for different speakers. Due to space
constraints, we put the details in Appendix C.
ASVspoof 2017 [29] and ASVspoof 2019 [61] are two popular
databases for replay attacks. However, we cannot convert the replay
attack samples in these two databases intomodulated replay attacks,
due to the lack of information of replay devices. Instead, to conduct
a fair comparison between modulated replay audio and classic
replay audio, we collect an in-house dataset with 6 replay devices.
For each of these replay devices, the dataset contains 222 modulated
replay audios as well as 222 corresponding classic replay audios.
All audio signals are collected in a quiet lab environment. We use
10-fold cross-validation accuracy as a metric since it can reflect the
whole performance of the system. Moreover, we implement the
prototype of our defense DualGuard in C++ language and run it on
a popular voice interactive platform, i.e., ReSpeakerCore v2.
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Figure 8: Amplitude spectrum of audio signals.
5.2 Effectiveness of Modulated Replay Attacks
We conduct experiments with the modulated replay attack. The
attack leverages the inverse filter to generate synthetic audio that
has a similar frequency spectrum as the genuine audio. The modu-
lated signals are generated in the Matlab environment and stored
in a lossless format. They are then transferred to replay devices for
performing attacks. Figure 8 shows the amplitude spectrum of the
signals during the modulated replay process in our experiments.
Here, the results are collected using the iPhone device, while we
have similar results with other devices. Figure 8(a) illustrates the
genuine audio that is captured directly from a live human in a
quiet room environment. The energy of genuine audio is mainly
concentrated in the low-frequency range. Figure 8(b) shows the
spectrum of the direct replay audio, which is captured from the
direct playback of the genuine audio. Due to the response prop-
erties of the speaker devices, the high-frequency components in
the direct replay audio have a higher relative proportion compared
with those in the genuine audio. The spectrum difference is a vital
feature in the various classic replay detection methods.
Figure 8(c) shows the spectrum of the modulated replay audio
collected by the ASR system. We can see that the low-frequency
energy is greatly enhanced to cope with the speaker effects. Thus,
the spectrum of the modulated replay audio is very similar to that
of the genuine audio in Figure 8(a). Moreover, we quantify the sim-
ilarity between the modulated replay audio and the genuine audio
using the L2 norm comparison [43] that has been widely used to
compare the spectrums of audio. It is defined as ∥K1 − K2∥22, where
K1 and K2 are two normalized spectrum distributions of audio, and
∥·∥22 is the square of Euclidean distance. The smaller the L2 norm
is, the more similar the two audios are. We measure the similarity
values on 660 pairs of audio samples, the average similarity between
the modulated replay audio and the genuine audio is 1.768 × 10−4.
However, the average similarity between the direct replay audio
and the genuine audio Srд is 15.71×10−4 on average, which is much
larger than the similarity between the modulated replay audio and
the genuine audio. The results demonstrate that the modulated
replay audio is much more similar to the genuine audio.
Furthermore, we re-implement 8 popular detection methods that
can be divided in three categories, namely, Cepstral Coefficients
Features based defense, High-frequency Features based defense,
and Low-frequency Features based defense. We apply those defense
methods to detect both direct replay attacks and modulated replay
attacks on 6 electronic devices, and the results in Table 1 show that
our modulated replay attacks can bypass all these countermeasures.
BypassingCepstral Coefficients Features BasedDefense. The
most popular method to detect replay attacks is based on cepstral
coefficients features extracted from the signal amplitude spectrum.
These cepstral coefficients features includes CQCC [56], MFCC [68],
LPCC [33], and MWPC [42]. Our experiments show that the ac-
curacy of detecting direct replay attacks can always achieve over
88% accuracy. However, Table 1 shows the accuracy significantly
drops to 1.80%∼58.56% when detecting the modulated replay audio.
The results indicate that our modulated attack can bypass existing
cepstral coefficients based detection methods.
BypassingHigh-frequency Features BasedDefense. As shown
in Figure 8(a) and Figure 8(b), the high-frequency spectral features
between the genuine audio and the replay audio are significantly
different. Therefore, a number of methods [27, 55, 65] detect re-
play attacks using high-frequency features, including Sub-band
Energy [27], HF-CQCC [65], and FM-AM [55]. Table 1 shows they
can achieve high accuracy on detecting the direct replay attack,
e.g., 96.43%. However, they fail to detect the modulated attack due
to frequency compensation. The highest accuracy on detecting the
modulated replay attack is only 38.74%.
Bypassing Low-frequency Features Based Defense. Besides
detection based on high-frequency features, a recent study [8] pro-
vides an effective method, i.e. Sub-bass, to detect replay attacks
based on low-frequency features. It defines a metric named energy
balance metric, which indicates the energy ratio of the sub-bass
range (20-80 Hz) to the low-frequency range (20-250 Hz). Our exper-
iments show that it can achieve 99.1% accuracy on detecting direct
replay attacks with the metric. However, the accuracy significantly
drops to less than 8% when detecting modulated replay attacks.
Table 1: The accuracy of different defense methods on detecting direct replay attacks and modulated replay attacks.
Detection Method† iPhone iPad Mi Phone Google Nexus BOSE Samsung TV
CQCC [56] 95.95% / 4.50%⋆ 95.51% / 6.31% 92.18% / 8.11% 89.93% / 2.25% 91.90% / 7.21% 95.51% / 6.76%
MFCC [68] 90.99% / 15.51% 93.24% / 18.92% 89.64% / 24.32% 89.19% / 27.03% 91.89% / 29.73% 90.99% / 27.71%
LPCC [33] 89.19% / 8.11% 87.84% / 9.91% 90.09% / 15.32% 86.03% / 18.92% 87.84% / 11.71% 90.54% / 11.26%
MWPC [42] 95.05% / 46.85% 92.79% / 36.04% 90.99% / 53.15% 95.05% / 43.24% 100.0% / 50.45% 86.93% / 58.56%
Sub-band Energy [27] 89.61% / 5.41% 89.22% / 4.50% 89.70% / 6.31% 88.61% / 10.81% 84.11% / 0.00% 85.57% / 0.90%
HF-CQCC [65] 90.91% / 25.23% 90.91% / 22.52% 90.91% / 24.32% 90.08% / 18.02% 93.94% / 38.74% 93.94% / 11.71%
FM-AM [55] 92.86% / 7.21% 92.86% / 17.12% 89.29% / 4.5% 92.86% / 9.91% 92.86% / 35.14% 96.43% / 12.61%
Sub-bass [8] 99.10% / 7.66% 99.10% / 4.50% 98.20% / 5.80% 98.65% / 4.95% 96.85% / 6.76% 97.30% / 5.40%
DualGuard 91.00% / 98.88% 90.54% / 98.32% 89.19% / 97.75% 90.45% / 98.22% 90.10% / 97.79% 89.64% / 99.65%
† The parameters of the different detection methods are listed in Appendix B.
⋆ The first number is on direct replay attack and the second number is on modulated replay attack.
In these 8 detection methods above, MWPC performs better than
other techniques. This is because MWPC can capture partial tem-
poral information using the mel-scale Wavelet Package Transform
(WPT) [64], which handles the temporal signals on different scales.
HF-CQCC can capture the high-frequency difference in signals.
Such partial temporal information and high-frequency difference
provide more useful features for the detection of replay attacks.
Thus, MWPC and HF-CQCC perform better than other techniques.
In addition, Table 1 also shows the experimental results of the mod-
ulated replay attack with six loudspeaker devices respectively. In
theory, whatever frequency response a speaker has, we can always
find the corresponding inverse filter to counteract the effect of the
replay process. As a result, the modulated replay attack does not
depend on any specific type of speaker. The experimental results in
Table 1 validate our attack design. For any specific detectionmethod,
the modulated replay attack exhibits similar performance when
leveraging different speaker devices. This property is critical for
real-world replay attacks, because it demonstrates the modulated
replay attack is independent of the loudspeaker. An attacker can
utilize any common speaker in our lives to perform the modulated
replay attack against ASR systems.
5.3 Effectiveness of Dual-Domain Detection
Our defense, i.e. DualGuard, contains two parts: time-domain detec-
tion and frequency-domain detection. The time-domain detection
mainly aims to identify modulated replay attacks and the frequency-
domain detection mainly aims to identify direct replay attacks. We
show the experimental results for these two parts, respectively.
Time-Domain Detection. We conduct experiments to evaluate
the accuracy for DualGuard to detect modulated replay attacks in
the time domain. As the local extrema ratio (LER) is the key feature
to detect replay attacks in the time domain, we first measure the
LER values of both modulated replay audios and genuine audios
from 6 different speaker devices.
Figure 9 illustrates the change of LER value from fine granularity
(with small window size) to coarse granularity (with large window
size). We can see that the LER decreases with the increase of the
window size. When the window size is small, the LER value of
the modulated replay audio is statistically larger than that of the
genuine audio, which is the main difference between these two
types of audios. As we mentioned in Section 4.2, the relatively
high LER value results from the ringing artifacts in the modulated
replay audio. The results demonstrate the feasibility to detect the
modulated replay attack in the time domain with the LER patterns.
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Figure 9: 20-dimensional local extrema patterns with differ-
ent granularity for genuine and modulated replay audios.
We conduct experiments to evaluate the detection accuracy in
the time domain with Algorithm 1. As shown in Figure 9, there
are no significant differences for the LERs of the genuine audio
and the modulated replay audio when the window size reaches 20.
Thus, we choose a 20-dimensional tuple {LER1, LER2, ..., LER20} in
our algorithm as the feature to detect the modulated replay attack.
Here, LERr denotes the LER value with the window size r . The
detection accuracy of DualGuard on modulated replay attacks is
shown in Table 1. We can see that DualGuard can accurately iden-
tify modulated replay attacks in the time domain. The detection
accuracy for modulated replay attacks always exceeds 97% with
different speakers. We also calculate the false positive rate of our
method in detecting modulated replay attacks. It always maintains
less than 8% false positive rate. The results demonstrate the gen-
eralization ability of DualGuard with different speakers. Actually,
the generalization is due to the robust artifact properties in the
time-domain signals (see Appendix A). Our time-domain defense
is independent of speakers. Our main contribution of time-domain
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Figure 10: The AUC distribution of genuine audios and re-
play audios with the classification decision threshold.
defense is on the key feature extraction. For the experiments on
comparing different classifiers, we refer the readers to Appendix D.
In our defense, we choose SVM due to its high performance and
easy deployment.
Frequency-Domain Detection.We conduct experiments to eval-
uate the accuracy for DualGuard to detect direct replay attacks in
the frequency domain. To decide the decision threshold of Algo-
rithm 2, we first obtain the Area Under CDF curve (AUC) from the
amplitude spectrum of audios. Figure 10 shows the AUC distribu-
tions for both genuine audios and direct replay audios. We can see
that the AUC values of genuine audios are concentrated and close
to 1, which indicates that the low-frequency energy is dominant.
However, the AUC values of direct replay audios are distributed and
small, which is consistent with the distributed spectrum of replay
audios. As shown in Figure 10, the best decision threshold is 0.817
since it can minimize the classification errors between genuine
audios and replay audios. Table 1 shows the detection accuracy
of DualGuard on direct replay attacks using Algorithm 2 with a
decision threshold of 0.817. The accuracy with different speakers
always exceeds 89%. We also calculate the false positive rate of our
method in detecting direct replay attacks. It always maintains less
than 5% false positive rate. Moreover, we conduct experiments with
the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 datasets to show that DualGuard can
effectively detect classic replay attacks. Our experimental results
show that DualGuard can achieve 87.13% and 83.80% accuracy in
these two datasets, respectively.
Moreover, we train another model only with frequency features
from a mix of genuine audios, direct replay audios, and modulated
replay audios in order to demonstrate the necessity to detect all
replay attacks in two domains. Our experimental results show that
the accuracy can only reach 63.36%. It is due to the great spectral
similarity of genuine audios and modulated replay audios in the fre-
quency domain. Therefore, the dual-domain detection is necessary
to accurately detect both two types of replay attacks.
5.4 Robustness of Dual-Domain Detection
We conduct experiments to show the robustness of our dual-domain
detection under different sampling rates, different recording devices,
different speaker devices, and different noisy environments.
Impact from Genuine Audio Sampling Rate.We evaluate the
impact of the sampling rate for recording the initial human voice
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Figure 11: Detection accuracy of different recording devices
with different factors.
by attackers. We first use TASCAM DR-40 digital recorder with
fs = 96 kHz to capture initial human voice. We also use iPhone
X with fs = 48 kHz to capture human voice. For both sampling
rates, the average detection accuracy of DualGuard on modulated
replay attack is 98.05%. That is because the sampling rate used by
attackers only changes the spectral resolution in the modulation
process. However, the waveform of modulated replay audios will
not be changed since D/A converter will convert modulated signals
into analog form before the replay process.
Impact from ASR Sampling Rate.We conduct experiments on
different recording devices with different sampling rates. In our
experiments, there are three settings of sampling rates for our
recording devices: (S1) TASCAM DR-40 with 96 kHz, (S2) TASCAM
DR-40 with 48 kHz, and (S3) a mobile phone (Xiaomi 4) with 44.1
kHz. Figure 11(a) shows the experimental results. We can see the
detection accuracy usually increases with the increase of sampling
rates. We find that although changing the sampling rate has little
effect on the frequency-domain detection, it significantly affects the
time-domain detection due to the change of the sampling interval.
Note that the smaller sampling interval means the finer detection
granularity of local extrema ratios, which increases the detection
accuracy. Moreover, in Figure 11(a), our experiments show that
DualGuard still achieves around 85% detection accuracy in the
worst case where the sampling rate is 44.1 kHz. We note that 44.1
kHz is the minimum sampling rate of common electronic devices in
our lives [23]. Therefore, DualGuard can achieve a good detection
accuracy with different sampling rates in common devices.
Impact from Different Recording Devices. In Figure 11(a), the
detection accuracy does not significantly change when we use
different recorders with the same sampling rate. The detection
accuracy changes less than 2% with different recording devices
when the sampling rate is 48 kHz or 44.1 kHz. The results show
DualGuard can be applied to different recording devices in our lives.
Impact from Different Noisy Environments. To test the detec-
tion accuracy under different noisy environments, we introduce
noise factors in our experiments. We test our detection method
under three scenarios: (1) in a quiet environment, (2) in a noisy en-
vironment with the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 60 dB, and (3) in a
noisy environment with the SNR of 40 dB. The additive noise signal
is produced by a loudspeaker that plays a pre-prepared Gaussian
white noise signal, simulating the noise in the real world. The noise
is mixed with the test signals with specific SNR. Figure 11(b) illus-
trates the detection accuracy in various noise conditions. We can
see that the impact of noise is limited. Particularly, the detection
accuracy remains unchanged when the SNR is 60 dB.When the SNR
drops to 40 dB, the detection accuracy decreases by 3.2% on average.
Actually, the impact of noise is mainly reflected in the time-domain
defense. General noise has little effect on the frequency-domain
defense part. With the increase of noise power, the burr amplitude
in the noise will also increase. As a result, noise can result in the
imprecise detection of the local extrema pattern in the test signals.
However, our experimental results indicate that DualGuard still
works well at the general ambient noise level.
5.5 Overhead of Dual-Domain Detection
We implement DualGuard with C++ language, and build a system
prototype in ReSpeaker Core v2, which is a popular voice interac-
tive platform with quad-core ARM Cortex-A7 of 1.5GHz and 1GB
RAM on-board. Our experimental results show that the embedded
program takes 5.5ms on average to process a signal segment of 32
ms length with the CPU usage of 24.2%. The largest memory usage
of the program is 12.05 MB. The results demonstrate the feasibility
of applying our dual-domain detection system in the real world.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review related research on attacks targeting ASR
systems, techniques on loudspeaker frequency response compensa-
tion, and defense systems against replay attacks, respectively.
Attacks on Speaker Dependent ASRs. A speaker dependent
ASR system is designed to only accept voice commands from spe-
cific users [66]. It verifies the speaker’s identity by matching the in-
dividual characteristics of human voice. There are four main spoof-
ing attacks against the speaker dependent ASRs. First, an attacker
can physically approach a victim’s system and alter its voice to im-
personate the victim [22]. Second, the attacker can launch a simple
replay attack by playing back a pre-recorded speech of the victim
to the ASR systems [60, 62]. Third, speech synthesis attacks gener-
ate artificial speech to spoof the ASR systems [12, 15, 34]. Fourth,
speech conversion attacks aim to achieve a speech-to-speech con-
version, so that the generated speech has the same timbre and
prosody with the victim speech [30, 67].
Attacks on Speaker Independent ASRs. A speaker independent
system is designed to accept commands from any person without
identity verification. Comparing to the speaker dependent system,
it is more vulnerable to attacks [3, 17, 26, 44]. Recently, researchers
found more surreptitious attacks that humans cannot easily per-
ceive or interpret. Dolphin attack is hard to be noticed since the ma-
licious audio is modulated into the ultrasonic range [47, 53, 71]. The
voice commands can also be modulated into laser light to launch au-
dio injection attack [54]. Also, the malicious audio can be perturbed
into an unintelligible form in either time domain or frequency do-
main [1]. To attack the machine learning module in ASRs, recent
research shows attackers can produce noise-like [11, 32, 58, 76]
or song-like [70] voice commands that cannot be interpreted by
human. Psychoacoustic model can also be applied to generate the
adversarial audio below the human perception threshold [49]. By
fooling the natural language processing (NLP) module after ASRs,
skill squatting attacks mislead the system to launch malicious ap-
plications [18, 31, 40, 74, 75].
Loudspeaker Frequency Response Compensation. In the field
of room acoustics, loudspeaker frequency response compensation is
a technique used to improve the sound reproduction [13]. The basic
method is to design an intelligent filter to flatten the frequency
response of the loudspeakers [10]. The frequency response com-
pensation can also be achieved by advanced filter with a generic
Hammerstein loudspeaker model [16]. For a multichannel loud-
speaker system, the minimax approximation method is proposed to
flatten the spectral response around the crossover frequency [37].
Also, a polynomial based MIMO formulation is proposed to solve
the multi-speaker compensation problem [9].
Defenses againstReplayAttacks. In ASVspoofingChallenge [29],
several replay detection methods are proposed by exploiting the
frequency-based features, such as Linear Prediction Cepstral Coeffi-
cient (LPCC) [42], Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) [68],
Constant Q Cepstral Coefficients (CQCC) [56], High Frequency Cep-
stral Coefficients (HFCC) [41] and Modified Group Delay Cepstral
Coefficient (MGDCC) [35]. Besides, the high-frequency sub-band
features can be used to detect live human voice by the linear predic-
tion (LP) analysis [65]. The sub-bass (low-frequency range) energy
is also an effective feature to detect the replay signals, though
this method can be bypassed by altering the speaker enclosure or
modulating the signals with our inverse filter [8]. The frequency
modulation features [21, 28, 55] can also be leveraged due to the
degraded amplitude components of replay noise.
Researchers propose to detect replay attacks using physical prop-
erties. Gong et al. detect the body-surface vibration via a wearable
device to guarantee the voice comes from a real user [19]. 2MA [7]
verifies the voice commands by sound localization using two micro-
phones. Yan et al. propose a spoofing detection method based on
the voiceprint difference between the authentic user and loudspeak-
ers [69]. All these methods require special equipment or specific
scenarios. VoiceLive [73] detects live human voice by capturing
the time-difference-of-arrival (TDoA) dynamic of phoneme sound
locations. VoiceGesture [72] reuses smartphones as a Doppler radar
and verifies the voice by capturing the articulatory gesture of the
user when speaking a passphrase. However, these two methods
work well only when there is a short distance between the recorder
and the userâĂŹs mouth.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new modulated replay attack against
ASR systems. This attack can bypass all the existing replay detection
methods that utilize different frequency domain features between
electronic speakers and humans. We design an inverse filter to
help compensate frequency distortion so that the modulated replay
signals have almost the same frequency features as human voices.
To defeat this new attack, we propose a dual-domain defense that
checks audio signal’s features in both frequency domain and time
domain. Experiments show our defense can effectively defeat the
modulated replay attacks and classical replay attacks.
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A MATHEMATICAL PROOF OF RINGING
ARTIFACTS IN MODULATED REPLAY
AUDIO
Theorem A.1. Uncertainty Principle: It is hard to accurately de-
termine the entire frequency response of a loudspeaker.
Proof. The frequency response of a loudspeaker contains ampli-
tude response and phase response. The measurement of amplitude
response is demonstrated in Section 3.4. However, it is difficult to
accurately measure the phase response.
For an electronic circuit system, the phase response can be mea-
sured by observing the electric signals xout (t) and xin (t) with an
oscilloscope. But in a loudspeaker system, we cannot measure the
phase response directly because the output signal xout (t) is a sound
wave. Other equipment (such as a receiver that converts soundwave
to electronic signal) is required to complete the measurement. But
the measuring system can introduce other phase differences. There
are mainly three influence factors:
(1) Time of flight. The propagation time will add phase differ-
ences. It is important to know the accurate delay time t = L/v0,
where L is the direct distance between the speaker and the sensor.
The sound speed v0 ≈ 344m/s (@20◦C).
(2) Time incoherence. Most of the available loudspeakers are not
time coherent, which will exhibit phase error in the measurement.
(3) Phase response of receiving sensor. The phase response of
receiving sensor is typically unknown, which will also introduce
phase shifts.
As a result, the accuracy of phase response measurement cannot
be guaranteed. That means the entire frequency response cannot
be accurate. Also we can prove that even small measurement errors
for phase response can cause ringing artifacts (see Theorem 3).
□
Theorem A.2. Compared to the genuine signal x(t), there are
phase shifts for each frequency component in the modulated replay
signal xmr (t).
Proof. In the modulated replay attack, the inverse filter only
needs to compensate the amplitude spectrum because the features
(e.g. CQCC,MFCC, LPCC) in the existing defenses only derives from
the amplitude spectrum. However, a loudspeaker has a non-zero
phase response in the real world, though it cannot be accurately
measured (see Theorem A.1).
Suppose the genuine audio x(t) is a digital signal. Through the
fast Fourier transform, x(t) would be decomposed as N frequency
components with the frequency set { f1, f2, ..., fN }. The frequency
spectrum of x(t) is denoted as {An ,φn }, where {An } is the ampli-
tude spectrum while {φn } is the phase spectrum. So, x(t) can be
represented as
x(t) =
∑
n
An · sin(2π fnt + φn ). (4)
Assume that the frequency response of the loudspeaker is H =
{Gn ,ψn }, where {Gn } is the amplitude response while {ψn } is the
phase response. By measuring the input and output test signals,
attacker can achieve the estimated frequency response Hˆ = {Gˆn , 0}.
The inverse filter is then designed based on Hˆ , denoted as I =
Hˆ−1 = {Gˆn−1, 0}. As a result, the generated modulated audio would
be
xm (t) =
∑
n
(An/Gˆn ) · sin(2π fnt + φn ). (5)
If the loudspeaker is ideal that does not have phase shift effects.
And the amplitude estimation is enough accurate. The estimated
replay output of the modulated audio would be
ˆxmr (t) =
∑
n
(An ·Gn/Gˆn ) · sin(2π fnt + φn )
≈
∑
n
An · sin(2π fnt + φn ) = x(t),
(6)
which is approximately equal to the genuine audio.
However, if the modulated audio xm (t) passes through the real
loudspeaker system H , the real modulated replay xmr (t) audio
would be
xmr (t) =
∑
n
(An ·Gn/Gˆn ) · sin(2π fnt + φn +ψn )
≈
∑
n
An · sin(2π fnt + φn +ψn ) , x(t).
(7)
Because xmr (t) has almost the same amplitude spectrum with
the genuine audio x(t), it can bypass the existing defense systems.
However, compared to the genuine signal x(t), there are phase
shifts for each frequency component in the modulated replay signal
xmr (t).
□
Theorem A.3. The phase shifts will cause the spurious oscillations
(ringing artifacts) in the original audio.
Proof. Suppose there is a small phase shift dφ in the N -th fre-
quency component of the signal x(t), while other frequency com-
ponents remain unchanged. The new signal would be
x ′(t) =
∑
n,N
An · sin(2π fn + φn ) +AN · sin(2π fN + φN + dφ)
=
∑
n
An · sin(2π fn + φn ) +AN · sin(2π fN + φN + dφ)
−AN · sin(2π fN + φN )
= x(t) + 2 · AN · sin(dφ2 ) · cos(2π fN + φN +
dφ
2 )
= x(t) +C · cos(2π fN + φN + dφ2 )
= x(t) + oN (t).
(8)
Because dφ is a very small shift value, C is a small constant that
satisfies |C | < |An · dφ |.
x(t) is an audio signal that is statistically smooth in the time do-
main. Hence, the new signal x ′(t) contains small ringing artifacts
because of the additional oscillations signal oN (t) with the fre-
quency of fN . The maximum amplitude of the spurious oscillations
is limited by |C | value.
Assume that the phase shifts of a loudspeaker system are denoted
asψ = {ψn } for all frequency components. The modulated replay
signal would be
xmr (t) =
∑
n
An · sin(2π fn + φn +ψn )
= x(t) + 2 ·
∑
n
An · sin(ψn2 ) · cos(2π fn + φn +
ψn
2 )
= x(t) +
∑
n
Cn · cos(2π fn + φn + ψn2 )
= x(t) + o(t).
(9)
The total spurious oscillations o(t) can be presented as
o(t) = 2 ·
∑
n
An · sin(ψn2 ) · cos(2π fn + φn +
ψn
2 ). (10)
The maximum amplitude Ao of the spurious oscillations is con-
straint by the following condition.
Ao =
∑
n
|Cn | <
∑
n
An · |ψi | (11)
As a result, the phase shifts of the loudspeakers will lead to the
ringing artifacts in the modulated replay audio.
□
B PARAMETERS IN DETECTION METHODS
We list the parameters of different replay detection methods here
for better understanding the modulated replay attack.
(1) Constant Q Cepstral Coefficients (CQCC) based method.
The Constant-Q Transform (CQT) is applied with a maximum fre-
quency of Fmax = fs/2 = 48kHz. The minimum frequency is set
to Fmin = Fmax /212 = 11.7Hz (12 is the number of octaves). The
value of bins per octave is set to 96. Re-sampling is applied with a
sampling period of d = 16. The dimension of the CQCC features is
19. Experiments were performed with all possible combinations of
static and dynamic coefficients.
(2)Mel FrequencyCepstral Coefficents (MFCC) basedmethod.
The window length is set to 3072 samples (32 ms), and the window
shift is 1536 samples (16 ms). Thus, the frequency bins would be
4096 samples. When we create the triangular mel-scale filterbanks,
the number of filterbanks is 26. The length of each filter is set to
2049. The sampling rate in experiments is 96 kHz.
(3) Linear PredictiveCepstral Coefficients (LPCC) basedmethod.
In the LPCC feature, the frame length is set to 1280 and the offset is
0. The threshold of the silence power is 10−4. The prediction order
in the LPC coefficients is set to 14.
(4) Mel Wavelet Packet Coefficients (MWPC) based method.
MWPC feature is based on wavelet packet transform, adapted to the
mel scale. Instead of using the energy of the frequency sub-bands,
MWPC use Teager Keiser Energy (TKE) Operator as the following
equation, Ψ(s(t)) = s(t)2 −s(t − 1)s(t + 1). The dimension of MWPC
features is 12, derived from the principle component analysis.
(5) High-frequency sub-band power based method. High fre-
quency energy ratio is measured between (2-4) kHz and (0-2) kHz.
(6) High-frequency CQCC based method. Similar to CQCC-
based methods. But it concerns the high-frequency (2-4kHz) band.
(7) FM-AM based method. This method aim to detect the fre-
quency modulation (FM) and amplitude modulation (AM) features
in replay audio. Here, the feature vector consists of the modula-
tion centroid frequency (MCF) and modulation static energy (MSE).
Which are both extracted from modulation spectrum. The Gaussian
mixture model (GMM) is employed as the back-end classifier.
(8) Sub-bass Frequency based method. Energy balance metric
indicates the energy ratio of the sub-bass range (20-80 Hz) to the
low-frequency range (20-250 Hz). The threshold is set to 0.228
according to the study [8].
C INVERSE FILTER IMPLEMENTATION
The speaker response estimation process contains two steps: dis-
crete amplitude response measurement and continuous amplitude
response fitting. In the discrete amplitude response measurement,
we measure the speaker input/output response coefficient by test-
ing 68 discrete typical frequency values. The discrete frequency
values are within four audio frequency ranges: bass (from 60 Hz to
225 Hz with a spacing of 15 Hz), low midrange (from 250 Hz to 500
Hz with a spacing of 50 Hz), midrange (from 550 Hz to 2 kHz with a
spacing of 50 Hz), and upper midrange (from 2.1 kHz to 4 kHz with
a spacing of 100 Hz). The input test signals are single-frequency
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(e) Bose Soundlink Micro
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(f) Samsung Smart TV
Figure 12: The amplitude response curves of different
speaker devices and their corresponding inverse filters.
signals with the same amplitude of 1, which are generated by using
the wavwrite tool and stored in a lossless format. The test audio is
then transferred to replay devices and played at medium volume
on loudspeakers, since the response function is not directly related
to the input amplitude according to our experiments. After the
spectrum analysis, we can get a rough response polygonal curve
across 68 discrete points.
In the finer-grained amplitude response fitting, we need to first
calculate the spectral resolution of themodulated signal∆f = fs/N ,
where fs is the signal sampling rate. N is the FFT point number
which is the minimum power of 2 that is greater than or equal to
the signal length L, denoted as N = 2 ⌈log2 L⌉ . The finer-grained
amplitude response curve can be achieved by the cubic spline fitting.
And the estimated response used in the inverse filter generation is
sampled with the signal spectral resolution ∆f . The inverse filter
is designed by using the finer-grained speaker response H (k). In
order to avoid divide-by-zero error in our experiments, the inverse
filter transfer function is calculated as 1/(H (k) + eps), where eps is
a small value from 0.001 to 0.002.
Figure 12 shows the amplitude response curves of different
speaker devices and their inverse filters. For mobile devices, the
response curves are high-pass filters due to the limited size of speak-
ers. Therefore, the inverse filters should be low-pass filters. For Bose
Soundlink Micro which has a tweeter and a woofer, there are obvi-
ous two-stage enhancements in the amplitude response. However,
the transfer function still cannot be considered as a pass-through
filter. The frequency response of Samsung Smart TV fluctuates with
frequency due to its two speakers that create stereo audio. We can
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Figure 13: Performance of different classifiers in the time-
domain defense.
use designed inverse filters to compensate the speaker amplitude
response, mitigating the decay of frequency components.
D CLASSIFIERS IN TIME-DOMAIN DEFENSE
In the time-domain defense, the local extreme ratio (LER) is a ro-
bust feature that can describe the ringing artifacts in modulated
replay audios. Therefore, the classifier selection has little impact
on the defense performance. To verify this hypothesis, we conduct
experiments to evaluate the effects of different classifiers on the
feature classification.
We classify the LER features using five common classifiers, in-
cluding Support Vector Machine (SVM), Decision Tree (DT), Naive
Bayes (NB), Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), and K-Star. The 10-
fold cross-validation accuracy is used as the evaluation standard.
The performance of different classifiers is shown in Figure 13. We
can see that SVM, Decision Tree, and KStar achieve better perfor-
mance than other classifiers. Gaussian Mixture Model obtains the
worst accuracy since the data distribution of LER features does
not subject to the normal distribution. Above all, we choose the
SVM model in our system due to its easy deployment and high
performance.
